thinking of professional economists who are outside the small community of China specialists.
In the late 1990s, when popular and professional interest in the general phenomenon of expanding FDI was increasing, Robert Feenstra (1999) wrote a useful article called "Facts and Fallacies about Foreign Direct Investment." The article corrected a number of widely misconceptions about the subject. Inspired by his title as well as his approach, we seek to dispel four widely held beliefs about U.S. affiliate activity in China by using the most recent available data.
Fallacy Number 1: U.S. FDI in China Is Large
The attention paid to China and its economic engagement with the rest of the world has led many to conclude that it is a leading destination of U.S. FDI. Casual observers believe that China's abundance of labor, high growth rates, and huge consumer markets attract large amounts of U.S. FDI. This view is even held by many corporate executives. A 2004 A. T. Kearney study found that China was perceived as the most favored location for FDI. The amount of capital fl owing to China from the United States in the form of FDI is thought to be sufficient to have a large effect on Chinese capital formation. However, data collected by Chinese statistical agencies indicate that U.S. FDI is a small component of total FDI in China, and data collected by U.S. agencies show that American fi rms' investment in China is a small, albeit quickly growing, part of their total investment abroad.
2
Statistics from the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China track investment by approved foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) on an annual basis. Figure 13 .1 breaks down this growth in investment by the nationality of the foreign owner or partial owner of the FIE. 3 Prior to 1989, FDI infl ows were limited and dominated by Hong Kong and Taiwanbased investors seeking to exploit opportunities in China's special economic zones.
After the international unease generated by the Tiananmen Incident dissipated, there was a sharp increase in FDI infl ows and a pronounced diversifi cation in its sources. It was in these years that Western countries and Japan began to enter the Chinese market in earnest. However, despite the growth, the role of American fi rms in these infl ows has been and remains relatively modest.
It is worth noting that even overall levels of FIE investment are modest. As indicated in fi gure 13.2, the share of fi xed asset investment performed by FIEs grew from near 0 percent to over 10 percent in the mid-1990s, then fell slightly to the high single digits where it remains in the mid-2000s. Foreigninvested enterprises accounted for less than 5 percent of urban employment in China in the middle of the current decade. 
Fig. 13.2 Fixed asset investment by organizational form
Source: Data on the fraction of fi xed asset investment undertaken by state-owned enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
4. The reported profi ts of U.S. affiliates in China have also grown rapidly, especially in recent years. Between the 1999 and 2004 benchmark surveys, net income grew nearly sevenfold. However, net income from Chinese affiliates only accounts for about 2 percent of the global net income of U.S. affiliates worldwide.
5. These employment fi gures need to be placed in some context. The total Chinese urban workforce in 2005 was 273 million persons. Foreign-invested enterprises from all source countries collectively employed about 12.4 million persons, less than 5 percent of the total. Clearly, U.S. fi rms' contribution to employment in China is vanishingly small. Consideration of these facts provide an interesting perspective on the work of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a,b) . These papers argue that Asian developing countries, including China, suffer from severe defi ciencies in their fi nancial systems that undermine the efficient allocation of domestic savings. As a consequence, these countries export capital to the United States, and this capital is then reinvested in Asian developing countries, including China, through multinational fi rms in the form of FDI. This type of investment is allocated in a relatively efficient manner, and it generates industrial expansion in export-related sectors and absorption of excess labor. Ju and Wei (2007) present a model that illustrates how fi nancial market imperfections in a developing country could generate capital exports to countries with better-developed fi nancial markets and substantial infl ows of FDI from those countries, even when there is free trade in goods that gives rise to a current account surplus.
However, the facts suggest that FDI in China does not exactly play the role assigned to it in this stream of research. Foreign-invested enterprises account for relatively little investment or employment generation in contemporary China, and American investment is but a minor component of that small contribution. As described in the following section, American FDI is focused on the domestic market rather than exports back to the United States, and U.S. affiliates tap Chinese sources of funds to fi nance their activities. The largest share of FDI infl ows appear to come from other Asian countries whose own fi nancial systems exhibit varying levels of development.
Just as American fi rms collectively account for a relatively small component of FDI in China, American investment in China accounts for a relatively small portion of total U.S. multinational activity around the world. Table 13 .1 shows 2004 total assets, sales, and employment of U.S. affiliates in China and in four regions that are the major destinations of U.S. FDI. China's share of U.S. multinational enterprise (MNE) total affiliate sales and assets were 1.9 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively, in 2004. Although the compound annual growth rate of U.S. MNE sales in China over the 1982 to 2004 period exceeds 40 percent, this rapid growth has proceeded from a small base, and it has taken place in a context of growing multinational activity worldwide. 4 Chinese affiliates comprise 4.5 percent of U.S. total affiliate employment, which is a larger share than their share of assets and sales, suggesting that work performed in China is relatively labor-intensive.
5
Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China 517 6. We are extremely grateful to Nicholas Lardy for a series of detailed discussions that clarifi ed our understanding of Chinese statistics on FDI, including the degree to which it may refl ect investment fi nanced by local borrowing.
As the data in table 13.1 illustrates, most U.S. MNE activity takes place in other developed countries like Canada and countries in Europe.
Although the data from both Chinese and U.S. sources indicate levels of FDI that are smaller than the popular press suggests, there are signifi cant discrepancies between data from these sources. The most comparable data sets attempt to provide measures of FDI fl ows as opposed to measures of MNE operating activity. A number of measurement issues could be important in explaining this discrepancy. First, the Ministry of Commerce reports measures of "actually utilized investment" by FIEs, and these measures may include investment that is fi nanced by capital fl ows from the foreign parent as well as investment that is fi nanced through local sources, including borrowing from local banks. Foreign-invested enterprises are surveyed regarding their investments. If the surveys do not precisely capture differences between investment fi nanced by retained earnings, capital transfers from the parent, investment funds provided by a local partner, and investment fi nanced by local borrowing, this could result in official Chinese FDI fl ow measures that are larger than the corresponding U.S. measures. When individual investment projects rely on investment from multiple sources, correct attribution could be difficult, generating such measurement problems. While we cannot point to fi rm evidence quantifying the existence of this particular source of measurement Tsai (2002), and Branstetter (2007) , among many other sources.
8. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a) document that multinationals tend to make extensive use of parent provided capital in countries with poor fi nancial development, and Antràs, Desai, and Foley (2007) provide a theoretical explanation for why this would be the case. This regularity does not seem to be prevalent in China.
error, U.S. data on the fi nancing patterns of U.S. affiliates in China suggests that it could play a role. Table 13 .3 provides some indication of how important local sources of capital are for foreign fi rms in China. In 2004, only 70 percent of U.S. affiliates based in China were wholly owned. Joint ventures often involve a local partner who provides equity capital as well as other inputs, and these types of organizational forms are more prevalent in China than in the other regions displayed in the table. Slightly more than one half of the assets of U.S. affiliates based in China are fi nanced with debt, and 61 percent of this debt is provided by local sources. The widely documented shortcomings of Chinese fi nancial markets make it surprising that Chinese lenders would fi gure so prominently.
7 However, given the hazards attending other classes of borrowers, the local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals can be seen as relatively creditworthy borrowers, ultimately backed by deep-pocketed foreign parents, and in possession of brand name and technological advantages over potential domestic competitors. Loans from the parent are 19 percent of total debt. While this share exceeds shares of intrafi rm debt elsewhere around the world, it is still fairly small. 8 If funds obtained locally are counted 10. We thank Shang-Jin Wei and Robert Feenstra for suggesting that we explore this question.
11. For a detailed explanation of these data, see Mataloni (1995) .
when computing FDI fl ows from the United States to China in the Chinese data but not the U.S. data, the official Chinese statistics can be viewed as overstating the contribution of U.S. fi rms to Chinese investment. A second factor that might contribute to the discrepancy concerns how source countries are determined in FDI fl ow data. In the U.S. data, any capital fl ow from the parent company to an affiliate in China through a holding company located in a third country is captured as a outfl ow from the United States to the third country, not from the United States to China. The exact procedures followed by Chinese statistical authorities are not clear, and it is possible that data collectors use information about the ultimate nationality of foreign investors to classify some of the FDI routed through tax haven holding companies according to the nationality of the ultimate parent. The fact that Chinese official statistics continue to measure large infl ows from tax haven jurisdictions suggests that this is unlikely to explain much of the discrepancy, but it could conceivably explain some.
Differences in measured FDI infl ows could also be a consequence of other deviations between Chinese and international statistical practice. The view that much of the discrepancy lies in differences in statistical practice was strengthened recently by massive revisions of the Chinese government's own official estimates of the net inward FDI stock. Beginning in 2005, the Ministry of Commerce released revised estimates of China's net FDI stock that reduced its size by a half. Previous estimates of the stock had been based on accumulated infl ows, and these data may not have captured reductions in FDI capital provided by foreigners. The new, revised FDI stock measures are not broken down by source country, but the magnitude of this revision amounts to an admission that the previously reported fi gures were far too high and suggests that the true level of FDI may lie closer to that indicated by U.S. data. 9 Given this, and the extent to which, even in the Chinese data, U.S. FDI is a relatively small component of cumulated total infl ows, we are quite confi dent in our conclusions regarding the relative size of U.S. FDI in China.
In order to explore why U.S. FDI in China appears to be small, we run gravity specifi cations to explain levels of U.S. MNE activity by country.
10 In these tests, we use confi dential data from BEA's 2004 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad on the operations of majority-owned nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents, which we aggregate to the country level.
11 We employ three different measures of U.S. MNE activity as dependant variables, the log of affiliate sales, the log of affiliate assets, and the log 12. We analyze employment compensation instead of employment because differences in labor productivity make it difficult to compare levels of employment across countries. of affiliate employment compensation. Our baseline specifi cation controls for geographic distance from the United States and the log of gross domestic product (GDP; measured at market exchange rates). It also includes a China dummy that is equal to 1 for China and zero for other countries. If the coefficient on the China dummy is negative, this would indicate that measures of U.S. MNE activity in China are lower in China than a simple gravity specifi cation would suggest they should be.
Once we have estimates from this baseline specifi cation, we include other country characteristics that could explain the extent to which U.S. MNEs engage in activity in China. Given the potential importance of taxes and corruption noted by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b) and Wei (2000a) , we include a measure of each country's corporate income tax rate and the corruption index taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk data set. In order to control for factors related to levels of wealth and economic development more generally, we also include the log of GDP per capita (measured at market exchange rates). Descriptive statistics for the data used in the analysis presented in table 13.5, as well as the analysis presented in table 13.7, appear in table 13.4.
The results of the gravity specifi cations appear in table 13.5. The dependent variable used in columns (1) to (4) is the log of affiliate sales, in (5) to (8) is the log of affiliate assets, and in (9) to (12) is the log of affiliate employment compensation.
12 Our baseline specifi cations appear in columns (1), (5), and (9). In each of these, the coefficient on the log of distance is negative and signifi cant, and the coefficient on the log of GDP is positive and signifi cant. These fi ndings are consistent with previous work and indicate that U.S. MNEs engage in more activity in larger countries that are closer to the United States.
In each of the baseline specifi cations, the coefficient on the China dummy is negative and signifi cant. In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that China is a large country that is located a considerable distance from the United States. The log of GDP for China is about 2 standard deviations above the mean value in the sample, and the log of distance from the United States is about 1 standard deviation above the mean. Therefore, China's size implies that it should attract a signifi cant amount of foreign investment, and its location tempers this implication. The estimated China dummy coefficients point out that levels of U.S. MNE activity in China are lower than would be predicted by a simple model in which levels of MNE activity vary with distance and country size.
The specifi cations in columns (2), (6), and (10) of table 13.5 include measures of corporate tax rates. This variable is not signifi cant in these specifi cations, and its inclusion does not change the negative coefficient on the 522 Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley 13. This fi nding confi rms earlier work by Wei (2000a) pointing to the negative impact of Chinese corruption on FDI infl ows.
China dummy very much. Controlling for corruption, as in columns (3), (7), and (11), reduces the magnitude and signifi cance of the China dummy. This dummy becomes insignifi cant although still negative in column (3) and marginally signifi cant in column (11), while the coefficient on the corruption index is positive and signifi cant. China has a corruption index of 2 on a scale of 0 to 6, where higher numbers imply lower levels of corruption. These results suggest that China's low level of U.S. MNE activity is at least in part a consequence of corruption or a factor that is correlated with corruption.
13
The specifi cations presented in columns (4), (8), and (12) also include the log of GDP per capita. Once this variable is included, the coefficient on the China dummy is no longer signifi cant. These results indicate that U.S. MNE activity is actually not lower than one would expect if one accounts for the fact that per capita income is low in China and corruption is high.
While caution is surely warranted in using regression coefficients derived from cross-sectional evidence to make predictions about the evolution of economic variables over time, it is interesting to consider what our regression coefficients imply about the future of U.S. FDI in China. Given its rapid rate of current economic growth, it is likely that per capita income multinational affiliate activity aggregated to the country level. Sales, assets, and employment compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. The log of distance is the log of distance between U.S. and affiliate host-country capital cities measured in miles. The log of GDP and the log of GDP per capita measure host-country gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita, respectively, and these variables are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The country tax rate is a measure of the median effective corporate tax rate paid by U.S. multinationals in a host country. The corruption index is an index of corruption that ranges from 0 to 6, with lower numbers indicating higher levels of corruption, and it is taken from the International Country Risk Guide political risk data. 
(8) (1)- (4) is the Log of affiliate sales, and it is the Log of affiliate assets and the Log of affiliate employment compensation in the specifi cations presented in columns (5)- (8) and (9)- (12), respectively. Sales, assets, and employment compensation are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. The China dummy is equal to one for China and zero for other countries.
The Log of distance is the log of distance between United States and affiliate host-country capital cities measured in miles. The Log of GDP and the Log of GDP per capita measure host-country gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita, respectively, and these variables are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The Country tax rate is a measure of the median effective corporate tax rate paid by U.S. multinationals in a host country. The Corruption index is an index of corruption that ranges from 0 to 6, with lower numbers indicating higher levels of corruption, and it is taken from the International Country Risk Guide political risk data. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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14. The work of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a,b) and Ju and Wei (2007) assigns an important role to Chinese fi nancial imperfections in generating capital outfl ows and FDI infl ows. While severe imperfections remain in Chinese fi nancial markets, many indicators show marked signs of improvement over the past decade. This has not been associated with a decline in measured FDI infl ows-in fact, FDI infl ows have expanded substantially in absolute terms, possibly suggesting the dominating effects of gravity factors rather than fi nancial imperfection.
15. Earlier versions of the Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003) hypothesis assigned an important role to U.S. investment in affiliates' export production.
16. See Burke (2000) .
and aggregate GDP in China will rise sharply over the next ten years. If the overall Chinese economy were to maintain growth rates of 10 percent per year over the next decade, the combined effects of the estimated coefficients on GDP and GDP per capita would predict that U.S. affiliate sales in China would more than triple. 14 13.2 Fallacy Number 2: U.S. FDI in China Is Export-Oriented
As the U.S.-China trade defi cit has grown in recent years, a number of commentators have suggested that it has been driven by U.S. purchases of goods produced by U.S. affiliates in China. 15 For example, in a 2000 briefi ng paper for the Economic Policy Institute, James Burke wrote, "The activities of U.S. multinational fi rms, together with China's protectionist trade policies, have had a signifi cant role in increasing the U.S. trade defi cit with China."
16
Foreign fi rms in China have indeed played an increasingly dominant role in China's trade. Figure 13 .3 shows the role of foreign fi rms in Chinese imports and exports, respectively. In a period in which Chinese exports and imports have been growing rapidly, these shares have been rising. By 2000, the share of FIEs in Chinese exports had reached more than 50 percent, and it continued to expand. Clearly, FIEs have accounted for a disproportionately large share of export growth during the years in which China has come to loom so large in world trade.
What role do U.S. affiliates play in this incredible surge of export growth? Almost none. Table 13 .6 presents statistics on the extent to which U.S. affiliates in China sell their goods to customers located in the United States and the extent to which they trade with the United States. The data illustrate that in 2004, about $39.7 billion of local affiliate sales were directed to the local market, and only $3.7 billion were directed to the U.S. market. The growth in exports from Chinese affiliates to the United States and to third countries has been explosive, but their scale remains small. In 2004, U.S. exports to affiliates in China and U.S. imports from affiliates in China comprised less than 5 percent of affiliate sales. These facts are not consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. affiliates operating in China are contributing to the large U.S. trade defi cit by producing there and selling back to the 17. These fi gures were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau Web site at http://www.census .gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2004. In 1999, U.S. exports to China totaled about $13 billion, and imports from China were almost $82 billion.
18. See Anderson (2006) , from whom the statistics in this paragraph and the next are taken. The language here closely follows his.
United States. Intrafi rm trade by U.S. multinationals does not loom nearly as large in intermediating U.S.-China trade as the overall role of FIEs in Chinese trade might suggest. In fact, a comparison of the total exports to and imports from China ascribed to U.S. multinationals seems rather small in comparison to the magnitudes of bilateral trade fl ows in 2004. Total U.S. imports from China were $196.7 billion, and total U.S. exports were $34.7 billion.
17 U.S. imports and exports between U.S. affiliates in China and their U.S. parents were $2.6 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively.
What is true of U.S. multinationals seems broadly true of multinationals from other Western countries. Every year, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce publishes a list of the top 200 largest mainland Chinese fi rms by export value. The 200 fi rms included in the 2005 list accounted for one-third of total mainland exports in that year, providing a useful, if incomplete, sample of important exporting fi rms of all nationalities. Inspection of this list suggests that the total share of U.S., European, and Japanese multinationals in the exports of the top 200 is only 11 percent. 18 The majority of fi rms in this list are indeed foreign invested, but the foreigners hail from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Like American fi rms, the leading European multinationals in China appear to be focused primarily on the The role played by Japanese fi rms in Chinese exports appears to lie somewhere in between the roles played by Western fi rms and fi rms headquartered in developing countries in Asia. Ahn, Fukao, and Ito (2007) have used Japanese data and South Korean data to undertake an extensive study of the role played by these fi rms' affiliates in regional trade fl ows. Because many Japanese fi rms route their exports through Hong Kong, these authors aggregate Chinese and Hong Kong trade statistics. They fi nd that the exports of Japanese fi rms' Chinese affiliates collectively account for nearly 41 percent of total Chinese/Hong Kong exports to Japan. Likewise, about 30 percent of total Japanese exports to China go to the Chinese affiliates of Japanese fi rms. The relatively greater role of Japanese affiliates in mediating Japan-China trade is likely to be related to geographic proximity and history. China is the closest major economy to Japan, and many Japanese companies were quite active in parts of China prior to the end of World War II.
The limited role played by U.S. fi rms in mediating U.S.-China trade is surprising given the extent to which large U.S. retail chains distribute Chinese goods. According to some estimates, Wal-Mart accounts for almost $20 billion of Chinese exports to the United States. However, Wal-Mart and other large-scale U.S. retailers typically procure their goods from Chinabased export-oriented manufacturing plants that are not U.S.-owned to any signifi cant degree.
19 They tend to purchase from the same Taiwanese, Hong Kong, and Korean fi rms they sourced from a decade or two ago, except that the fi nal production is now based in mainland China. In order to explore in more detail if U.S. affiliates based in China are more focused on serving the local market than one should expect, we again make use of gravity specifi cations. In table 13.7, we report results of tests that are identical to those presented in table 13.5 except that dependant variables measure the extent to which U.S. affiliates based in different countries focus on serving markets outside of their host country. These tests use data aggregated to the country level for the year 2004.
The dependent variable used in columns (1) to (4) of table 13.7 is the log of affiliate sales to persons outside the affiliate's host country; in (5) to (8) it is the share of affiliate sales to persons outside the host country and the United States, and in (9) to (12) it is the share of affiliate sales to persons in the United States. Our baseline specifi cations are given in columns (1), (5), and (9), and these include the log of distance from the United States, host-country GDP, and a China dummy as controls. The coefficient on the China dummy in column (1) is negative and marginally signifi cant; it is negative and signifi cant in column (5), but it is positive and insignifi cant in column (9). The negative coefficients on the China dummy in specifi cations explaining the log of affiliate sales outside the host country and the share of sales to countries other than the host country and the United States could be misleading if third-country markets were inconvenient to serve from China. However, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all large markets that are reasonably close by. Taken together, there is only some evidence that U.S. affiliates in China are less focused on serving consumers outside their host country than are U.S. affiliates elsewhere. In fact, the share of sales to persons in the United States is not lower than one would expect once country size and distance from the United States are taken into account.
Levels of sales to countries other than the host country are higher for affiliates located closer to the United States and for affiliates in larger countries. Shares of sales to persons in the United States are higher for affiliates located closer to the United States, but distance from the United States does not, perhaps unsurprisingly, affect the share of sales to persons in countries other than host countries and the United States. The log of GDP is also not signifi cant in explaining shares of sales to the United States or countries other than the host country and the United States.
Adding corporate tax rates to our specifi cations reduces the coefficients on the China dummy. The negative coefficients on this dummy presented in columns (2) and (6) of table 13.7 are both statistically signifi cant. The negative coefficients on host-country tax rates imply that sales to persons outside the host country are higher in low tax countries. Tax rates faced by multinationals are relatively low in China. Therefore, accounting for corporate tax rates would lead one to predict that affiliates based in China should be more focused on serving markets outside of China. When we add the corruption index to the specifi cations, the coefficients on this variable are positive and (1)- (4) is the log of affiliate sales outside of the host country, and it is the share of affiliate sales to countries other than the host country and the United States and the share of affiliate sales to the United States, respectively, in the specifi cations presented in columns (5)- (8) and (9)- (12). Sales are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. The China dummy is equal to one for China and zero for other countries. The Log of distance is the log of the distance between U.S. and affiliate host-country capital cities measured in miles. The Log of GDP and the Log of GDP per capita measure host-country gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita, respectively, and these variables are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The Country tax rate is a measure of the median effective corporate tax rate paid by U.S. multinationals in a host country. The Corruption index is an index of corruption that ranges from 0 to 6, with lower numbers indicating higher levels of corruption, and it is taken from the International Country Risk Guide political risk data. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses.
signifi cant in columns (3) and (7), indicating that affiliates in countries with less corruption sell more output outside the host country. Once this variable is included, none of the coefficients on the China dummy are signifi cant. The specifi cations presented in columns (4), (8), and (12) also include a control for the log of GDP per capita. In each of these specifi cations, the coefficient on the China dummy is positive, although these coefficients are not signifi cant. These results suggest that once one accounts for levels of corruption and country wealth, as well as tax rates, distance, and country size, U.S. affiliates in China are not less export oriented than affiliates based in other countries.
Fallacy Number 3: U.S. Multinational Investment in China Displaces Investment Elsewhere
U.S. workers often express concerns about increased competition from workers located in countries like China. Given the vast supply of labor in China, the low costs of production, and the alleged existence of technologically skilled workers, few employees outside of China feel secure. In the extreme, these concerns would predict that increased activity in China by U.S. multinationals would displace activities that had been performed elsewhere.
The results of the previous sections suggest these concerns may be misplaced. As we have already demonstrated, levels of U.S. affiliate activity in China are modest. Furthermore, these affiliates have been and remain focused on the Chinese market. Given this, one would not expect increased activity in China to displace activity in other countries to a signifi cant degree. However, we can approach this question much more directly. Using the BEA data, it is possible to see if multinationals that expand employment in China cut it at home or among their other affiliates. The data presented in table 13.8 address this issue by providing number counts of incidents in which fi rms that increase or decrease employment in China increase or decrease employment in other locations. The data include observations computed using fi rmlevel data from the 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 benchmark survey results, so there are three periods over which increases and decreases are considered, the 1989 to 1994, 1994 to 1999, and 1999 to 2004 periods. Entries into China by existing multinationals are counted as increases in employment in China, and exits from China are counted as decreases.
The data in the top panel refl ect the growth in employment that has taken place among Chinese affiliates of U.S. multinationals. It also points out that fi rms that expand in China are almost as likely to expand employment domestically as they are to cut it. This evidence is not what one would expect if growth in China were strictly displacing activity in the United States. The bottom panel displays similar data, but instead of considering the trade-off between activity in China and activity in the United States, it considers the trade-off between activity in China and activity among other affiliates. It appears that fi rms that are increasing employment in China are increasing, and not decreasing, it elsewhere. Although somewhat crude, these statistics suggest that at least extreme notions that would give rise to concerns of multinational employees in the United States and elsewhere in the world are unfounded.
Fallacy Number 4: U.S. Multinationals Are Aggressively Exploiting China's Growing Technological Prowess
In the United States, China is often perceived as being an emerging technological superpower. Industrialists, economists, and policymakers believe that China is becoming an attractive location to perform innovative activity. In 2003, Intel chief executive officer (CEO) Craig Barrett identifi ed China's rising technological strength as constituting a competitive threat to U.S.-based high-technology industries. 20 Harvard economist Richard Freeman (2006) has outlined the potential consequences of the globalization of the science and engineering workforce for America's historical pattern of comparative advantage in high-technology industries. Freeman points to the striking rise in the number of multinational research and development (R&D) centers in China-more than 700 by the end of 2004-and argues that this is only the harbinger of greater reallocation yet to come. 21 Puga and Trefl er (2005) point to the rise of R&D activity in China and declare that the economics profession should "wake up and smell the ginseng!" In its 2005 annual survey of global FDI trends, the World Investment Report produced by UNCTAD highlighted the internationalization of R&D and singled out Notes: This table present number counts of the incidents in which changes in a fi rm's employment in China are associated with changes in the fi rm's employment in the United States and among its other affiliates. Changes are measured over three distinct time periods, 1989 -1994 , 1994 -1999 , and 1999 -2004 . 22. However, Schott (2008 qualifi es this fi nding by documenting a decline in the prices of Chinese exports relative to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) exports of similar products.
23. This fraction takes as its denominator the sum of expenditures on R&D preformed by the U.S. parent and the R&D expenditures performed by all affiliates of U.S. fi rms in all countries. the growth of foreign R&D centers in China as a development of particular signifi cance. Management scholar Minyuan Zhao (2004) has studied the patents generated by these centers for clues as to how American multinationals have apparently learned to engage in large-scale, sophisticated R&D in a national context with notoriously weak intellectual property rights.
Proponents of the view that China is quickly emerging as a favorable location for high-tech activity often point to evidence on the growing sophistication of China's exports as proof of their claims. Schott (2008) , for example, fi nds that over time Chinese exports exhibit rising sophistication relative to countries with similar aggregate endowments.
22 Rodrik (2006) fi nds an unusually high degree of technological sophistication in China's export pattern. Cui and Syed (2007) suggest that recent changes in China's trade patterns indicate that it is rapidly becoming a surprisingly mature economy. Preeg (2004) , a researcher with the Manufacturers Alliance, charges that China's emergence as a major supplier of information technology, communication, and electronic products poses a major challenge to U.S. commercial and security interests.
Several considerations suggest these views are overblown. First, the extent of innovative activity performed in China by U.S. multinationals is surprisingly modest. Table 13 .9 provides 2004 data on expenditures for R&D performed by U.S. affiliates in China, U.S. affiliates based in other regions, and the U.S.-based parent operations of U.S. MNEs. Only $622 million was spent by U.S. MNEs on R&D in China, an amount that is about threetenths of 1 percent of the total R&D undertaken globally by U.S. MNEs.
23
Nearly 85 percent of R&D performed by U.S. multinationals in 2004 was performed by the U.S.-based parent company. Less than 13 percent of the $4.9 billion of the R&D that U.S. multinationals performed in the Asia and Pacifi c region was performed in China.
U.S. patent data also indicate that China's innovative capability is more limited than some have suggested and that U.S. fi rms are not performing very much innovative activity there. Anyone seeking to protect intellectual property within the borders of the United States must apply for patent protection from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (U.S. PTO). Given the importance of the U.S. economy to the world in general and to China in particular, it is reasonable to regard patents taken out by China-based inventors in the United States as a useful indicator of inventive activity. The CASSIS CD-ROM produced by the U.S. PTO provides information about U.S. patents, and we use the December 2006 version to produce fi gure 13.4.
24. Nearly 40 percent of China-generated U.S. patents identify inventors based in at least one other country. In contrast, nearly 90 percent of U.S. patents granted to U.S. fi rms in the last three years are generated by inventors based solely in the United States, and a similar percentage of Japan-generated U.S. patents represent the product of only Japanese inventors. Figure 13 .4 tracks China-generated patents in various categories over time. The dramatic growth in patenting over time is evident in this graph, but levels of patenting activity remain low. From the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2006, the U.S. PTO granted 3,447 patents to inventors based in China or teams of inventors that included at least one member with a Chinese address. Over the same period, inventors with ties to Japan received nearly 241,000 patents, inventors with ties to Taiwan received over 39,000 patents, and inventors with ties to Israel received over 8,000 patents.
It is informative to break out patents generated in China into patents in which all listed inventors at the time of invention were based in China and also to break out patents that were assigned to U.S. corporate entities. As fi gure 13.4 indicates, a large and growing fraction of patents with Chinese inventors refl ect collaborative work with inventors located elsewhere. 24 U.S. corporate entities appear to be associated with fewer than 1,000 granted patents, and only a relatively small percentage of China-generated patents assigned to U.S. multinationals refl ect the inventive input of a purely Chinese team of inventors. This could indicate a deliberate attempt on the part of U.S. R&D centers in China to conduct research that only has value when combined with a complementary research input from the United States or from another relatively advanced country. Zhao (2006) describes this strategy as a way for U.S.-based multinationals to cope with the poor intellectual property rights regime in China. Another interpretation is that Chinese scientists and engineers, despite impressive levels of raw talent and basic skills, fi nd it difficult to innovate effectively at the technological frontier on 25. One can combine the patent data with the R&D data to generate crude estimates of the patents per R&D dollar generated by U.S. affiliate R&D spending in China and compare that to the patents per R&D dollar generated by R&D spending by the parent fi rm in the United States. According to our estimates, the ratio of U.S. patents per R&D dollar in China is less than half this ratio in the United States. This difference is consistent with the view that the R&D conducted in Chinese affiliates tends to be more focused on modifi cation of the parent fi rm's technology for the Chinese market or the development of technology specifi cally for that market than it is on the kind of fundamental, strategically sensitive research conducted in the parents' own labs. their own and often require the input of R&D managers and experts based elsewhere in the world to go beyond the existing state of the art.
It is also possible to use the U.S. PTO data to assess the importance of China, relative to other countries, in generating patents for U.S. fi rms and to examine which fi rms do have inventors based in China. There are 120 U.S. corporate assignees who have been granted at least two patents for which at least one inventor was based in China. The Chinese patents of these fi rms comprise only slightly more than 1 percent of the annual patenting activity of these fi rms in 2006. 25 By far, the leading U.S. fi rm, in terms of China-generated patents, is Microsoft. Table 13 .10 lists the top ten corporate assignees in terms of China-generated U.S. patents. Microsoft has nearly three times as many Notes: China-generated U.S. patents are U.S. utility patents for which at least one listed inventor was resident in China at the time of patent application. Purely Chinese patents are those patents for which all listed inventors have addresses in the People's Republic of China. Purely Chinese patents of U.S. fi rms are "purely Chinese" patents assigned to a U.S. corporate entity.
Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
26. An interesting account of Microsoft's early missteps in the PRC is provided by Khanna (1997) . Poor relationships with the central government of the PRC ensured that rates of piracy of Microsoft products in China remained among the highest in the world for years.
27. In private conversations with the authors, some U.S. corporate managers have referred to the R&D centers opened by their fi rms in China as "PR&D" centers-that is, they were as much about public relations efforts directed at a mainland regime reluctant to enforce intellectual property rights as they were about "real" research and development.
China-generated patents as IBM and Intel. After years of fractious relationships with the Chinese government, Microsoft sought to cultivate more harmonious ties with key government officials by opening multiple research centers in the People's Republic of China (PRC). 26 Microsoft lavished rather large sums of money on these facilities and sought to attract high-profi le researchers to them, an effort described at length in a recent book by Buderi and Huang (2006) , Guanxi (The Art of Relationships). Senior Microsoft executives, including former CEO Bill Gates, have regularly reiterated their commitment to conducting world-class research in China at the very frontier of software technology. In the context of that public commitment, it is interesting to note that Microsoft's China-generated patents amount to less than 4 percent of its total cumulative patents to date. 27 If we restrict ourselves to patents with solely Chinese inventor teams, this fraction drops to about 1.5 percent. 28. This section of the text refl ects the infl uence of Nicholas Lardy's writings on this subject. Some of the facts and fi gures in the following paragraphs reproduce points made in Lardy's presentations and in Branstetter and Lardy (2006, 2008) .
Interestingly, the leading patent-generating fi rm in China, with more than four times Microsoft's cumulated patent stock and a commanding lead over any indigenous mainland Chinese fi rm, is the Taiwanese contract manufacturing fi rm, Hon Hai, also known by its English trade name, Foxconn. Hon Hai is one of fi ve Taiwanese manufacturing fi rms to appear on this top ten list. As is the case with export-oriented manufacturing, it appears the Taiwanese fi rms are more aggressively exploiting the opportunities to conduct research in China than are their U.S. counterparts.
Although the amount of innovative activity performed in China is lower than it is often perceived to be, the types of goods China exports are fairly technologically advanced. This has posed a puzzle to some economists. However, China is able to export huge quantities of high-tech goods only because it imports most of the high value added parts and components that go into these goods.
28 Figure 13 .5 displays the level of Chinese exports and imports in electronic and information industry products. The domestic value added component of the value of exported electronic and information 29. An entertaining specifi c example of this is provided by Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick (2007) , who break down the production process for an Apple iPod, all of which are assembled in and exported from China. The authors' careful, if incomplete, cost accounting suggests that Chinese value added represents at most a few dollars of the roughly $150 factory cost for the typical iPod.
30. In light manufacturing, in contrast, domestic content accounts for nearly 70 percent of the value of exports. See Anderson (2007) for a useful review of the most recent data. technology products, while growing, remains quite low. 29 Even in the most recent years for which data are available, more than 70 percent of the value of these exports is comprised of imported inputs.
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While U.S. multinationals, with a few exceptions, do not play a major role in Chinese exports of high-tech goods, we also see in U.S. affiliate data a strong correlation in high-tech industries between imports from the parent and sales. Regression analyses of affiliate sales on measures of imported intermediates from the parent show a dramatically stronger connection for more R&D intensive industries, underscoring the relatively higher dependence of such activity in China on key inputs from the parent. Taken together, levels of R&D conducted in China, the amount of patenting associated with innovation based in China, and the low Chinese value added in high-tech Chinese exports suggest that China is far from becoming a technological superpower that will be home to a large share of U.S. MNE innovative activity.
Conclusions
The emergence of China as an important trading economy has been one of the most signifi cant economic developments of our time, and it has captured the attention of the popular press. Understanding the economic changes in China while they are occurring is challenging, and several misconceptions about the role played by different factors, especially the role played by U.S. FDI, have become widely held. In this paper, we attempt to address four commonly held views that we believe do not refl ect an informed interpretation of available data. These relate to the size of U.S. FDI in China, the degree to which it is export oriented, the extent to which it displaces U.S. multinational activity elsewhere, and the amount of innovative activity that is associated with it.
Despite the size of the Chinese economy and its rapid growth, the scale of U.S. affiliate activity there remains modest. U.S. affiliates based in China account for less than 2 percent of total U.S. affiliate sales, they contribute relatively little to aggregate Chinese investment, and they play a surprisingly small role in mediating the expansion of U.S.-China trade. Partly because of their focus on the domestic market and partly because of the small scale of their operations, U.S. affiliates in China do not appear to have signifi cantly displaced investment elsewhere as they have increased the scale and scope of their operations in China.
The limited level of U.S. affiliate activity in China does not indicate an unusual degree of aversion to China on the part of U.S. investing fi rms. Rather, it refl ects the fact that most U.S. affiliate activity takes place in countries that are not only large, but also that are geographically proximate to the United States, that have low levels of corruption, and that are wealthy. Controlling for GDP, distance, tax rates, corruption, and GDP per capita, U.S. MNE activity in China and the extent to which U.S. affiliates in China sell goods to the United States and other countries besides China are neither especially low, nor especially high.
Despite widespread interest in the possible emergence of China as a center of technological innovation, U.S. affiliates conduct relatively little R&D in the country, and affiliate activity in technology-intensive industries appears to remain quite dependent on the supporting activities of the parent fi rm. China's ability to innovate, as evidenced by numbers of U.S. patents with at least one China-based inventor, remains well behind the much more developed capabilities of other East Asian countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The picture traced out by rapid changes in the structure of Chinese exports of an emerging technological superpower belies a more modest reality. China's exports of high-technology goods are still quite dependent on imported components, technology, and expertise.
Rapid growth of Chinese aggregate GDP, income per capita, and human capital is likely to motivate U.S. fi rms to continue to expand their base of activity there. Given that current levels of activity are much smaller than levels of activity elsewhere, the relative scale of affiliate activity in China is likely to remain modest for many years to come. However, if the pace of progress persists, some of today's fallacies about U.S. FDI in China are likely to become facts.
